Commit graph

4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hound
f003c58982 houndd: arm the gate from the daemon and shed root while doing it
Wires the execution gate into DaemonState::boot, reports it on the wire
and in `hound status`, and reduces the daemon to the two capabilities it
actually needs.

Verified live, gate marked on a scratch tmpfs rather than /:

  clean binary   ran
  EICAR binary   execve -> EPERM, "Operation not permitted"
  hound status   Exec gate: armed on /tmp/hound-live, 2 allowed, 1 blocked
  CapPrm/CapEff/CapBnd  0000000000200004  (CAP_SYS_ADMIN | CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)

Three ordering bugs found by checking rather than assuming, all of which
returned success while doing nothing:

* Capabilities are per-thread. Dropping them after spawning the reader
  and workers reduced only the main thread and left four workers holding
  full root — the exact opposite of the intent. The drop now happens
  after fanotify_init and the marks, but before any thread exists, so
  workers inherit the reduced set.

* PR_CAPBSET_DROP needs CAP_SETPCAP in the effective set, and capset had
  already thrown it away. Every bounding-set drop failed EPERM, silently,
  leaving a full CapBnd behind a log line claiming otherwise. Bounding
  set is now drained first, while the authority to do it still exists.

* Because both of the above looked like successes, drop_to_gate_minimum
  now reads CapEff and CapBnd back from /proc/self/status and errors if
  they are not what was asked for. A privilege reduction that cannot be
  observed has not happened.

Also: `hound status` grew an Exec gate line. timed_out above zero is the
number worth alarming on — it means the watchdog is releasing processes
unscanned and the gate has quietly degraded to advisory.

Gate arming and every failure path now log to stderr, so the journal
records a security-relevant state change instead of only the in-memory
event ring.

86 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 22:51:41 -05:00
6ef296caa1 Full feature set: realtime monitor, quarantine vault, rootkit scan, settings, events
Daemon (houndd)
- realtime.rs: inotify monitor over watched dirs (default ~/Downloads,
  ~/Documents, ~/Desktop), ClamAV scan on touch, on_detect action
  (quarantine/rename/remove), ransomware heuristic (writes/renames per
  minute above threshold -> 'watching'/'alarm' + critical event)
- quarantine.rs: SHA-256-keyed vault under ~/.local/share/hound/quarantine,
  add/list/restore/remove with original-path metadata
- rootkit.rs: setuid anomaly detection (allowlisted stock binaries),
  deleted-but-executing inodes, world-writable /usr /bin; 3 severity levels
- settings.rs: persisted ~/.config/hound/settings.json, hot-reload on set
- events.rs: ring buffer of severity-tagged events, query + clear

API (hound-api): Settings, Event, QuarantineEntry, RootkitScan/
RootkitFinding, RealtimeStatus types + 10 client methods; Status gains
engine field (engine-agnostic seam)

CLI (hound): events, quarantine list|add|restore|remove, settings
[show|paused|auto-update|notify|realtime on|off|watch|on-detect|
max-size|exclude], rootkit, realtime [status|on|off] — color human
output, --json everywhere

GUI (Tauri 2):
- 16 backend commands bridging every client method
- tray watcher: 1s poll loop, 4-state icon ladder (green/amber/red/gray),
  desktop notification on fresh critical events
- 6-tab frontend: Protection (hero + scan + update), Quarantine (vault
  manager + manual add), Realtime (stats + watch list + toggle), Rootkit
  (on-demand scan), Alerts (event log + clear), Settings (full editor)
- capabilities/default.json for dialog/notification/event permissions

Verified: 27/27 workspace tests, live E2E — EICAR dropped in ~/Downloads
auto-quarantined by the running daemon (critical event logged, file
removed from origin).
2026-08-20 20:33:44 -05:00
566e0cbccb Freshclam wrapper: update RPC, DB age in status, engine-agnostic fields
- hound-api: DbFile (file + updated_at), Status.db, UpdateResult, Client::update()
- houndd: probe() extracts signature freshness from /var/lib/clamav mtimes;
  update() tries 'sudo freshclam', falls back to plain 'freshclam' and
  reports the honest reason on failure; output capped to 2KB tail
- hound CLI: 'hound update' with --json parity and human output
- rename Status.clamav_present -> engine_present + add Status.engine
  (prep for the engine seam; wire stays engine-agnostic)

Live-verified: status shows DB file + last-modified RFC3339; update
returns ok:false with the real log for a plain user (exit 1).
2026-08-20 17:54:50 -05:00
2cf41ce3bd Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket
- hound-api: shared wire types (Status/ScanRequest/ScanResult/Found)
  + line-delimited JSON-RPC client used by both clients
- houndd: daemon binding a Unix socket, dispatching status/scan to
  ClamAV, parsing per-file results, deduping --allmatch hits
- hound: clap CLI (status / scan --json), colored human output,
  exit codes 0=clean 1=threats
- workspace scaffolding: toolchain, gitignore, env example, editorconfig
2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00