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Hound 42cd97d59f supply: read lockfiles, and only ever call a malicious package malicious
Lockfile parsing for npm (all three lockfile versions), yarn, cargo,
poetry, requirements.txt, go.sum, Gemfile.lock and composer.lock, wired
through the indicator index so a sweep checks real dependencies against
real definitions. Signed packs load in the daemon; the sweep gets the
index; `hound supply-chain` cites the OSV record it matched.

A lockfile is the right thing to read: it names every transitive
dependency at an exact version in one small file, and it lists what WILL
be installed rather than what already is — which matters when the
payload runs during installation.

Every parser is hand-written rather than pulling in a TOML and a YAML
crate. Two fields from each format, and a scanner parsing hostile input
should have as little parsing surface as it can.

The important part of this commit is a false positive it fixes.

Building a pack from the whole crates.io OSV export and sweeping a
project produced TWO criticals: rustdecimal, correctly, and **tokio
1.38.0**, which is not malware and never has been. The export is 1,524
GHSA and 1,206 RUSTSEC vulnerability advisories against 19 malicious-
package records, and the parser treated all of them as malware.
GHSA-2grh-hm3w-w7hv describes a tokio race condition fixed in 1.8.1;
Hound reported a version released years later as malicious.

Two independent bugs, either of which alone is fatal:

* Vulnerability advisories were ingested at all. A malicious package
  should not exist; a vulnerable one is a legitimate library with a bug
  and most of its versions are fine. Records must now PROVE they are
  malicious-package reports — a MAL- id, the malicious-packages-origins
  marker, or GHSA's "Malicious code in" wording — and anything
  unrecognised is dropped.

* Unrecognised version ranges fell back to "all versions", which is the
  opposite of safe. That is what turned a range of 1.8.0-to-1.8.1 into
  a verdict on every tokio ever published.

Rebuilt against the same input, the pack now holds 19 indicators rather
than 3,614, rustdecimal is still caught and cites MAL-2022-1 rather than
a GHSA advisory, and tokio and serde are clean. The real tokio advisory
is now a regression fixture, because anything that flags tokio is a
product nobody trusts twice.

Also: definitions loading fails CLOSED on authenticity and OPEN on
everything else. No trusted key means no definitions and a message
saying so, because an operator who believes they are protected and is
not is worse off than one who knows. A pack that fails verification is
skipped and the rest still load. No packs at all is a working daemon —
install scripts, prompt injection, pickles and MCP audits need no feed.

There is deliberately no placeholder signing key compiled in. A fake key
that looks real is how a development shortcut becomes a shipped
vulnerability; an empty trust store is noisy in the way that gets fixed
before release. HOUNDD_DEFS_KEY supplies one for development.

294 tests pass across the workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 07:29:47 -05:00
assets/icons packaging: .deb, AppImage, rpm spec, PKGBUILD, hardened unit, app icon 2026-08-20 23:37:17 -05:00
crates supply: read lockfiles, and only ever call a malicious package malicious 2026-08-21 07:29:47 -05:00
dist houndd: the persistence ledger 2026-08-21 06:50:35 -05:00
gui packaging: .deb, AppImage, rpm spec, PKGBUILD, hardened unit, app icon 2026-08-20 23:37:17 -05:00
packaging packaging: .deb, AppImage, rpm spec, PKGBUILD, hardened unit, app icon 2026-08-20 23:37:17 -05:00
.editorconfig Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00
.env.example Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00
.gitignore Full feature set: realtime monitor, quarantine vault, rootkit scan, settings, events 2026-08-20 20:33:44 -05:00
Cargo.lock supply: read lockfiles, and only ever call a malicious package malicious 2026-08-21 07:29:47 -05:00
Cargo.toml hound-defs: OSV ingest, the IOC index, and signed packs 2026-08-21 07:06:00 -05:00
README.md Engine seam (ScanEngine trait) + Tauri GUI 2026-08-20 17:55:40 -05:00
rust-toolchain.toml Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00

Hound Antivirus

A premium, freemium antivirus for Linux. One engine, three faces: a Rust daemon (houndd), a CLI (hound), and a Tauri GUI with a system-tray sentinel that changes color with your security state.

Built for the distros people actually run: Ubuntu, Debian, Linux Mint, and anything else that ships ClamAV.

Repository layout

antivirus/
├── Cargo.toml              # Rust workspace
├── crates/
│   ├── hound-api/          # shared wire types + socket client (daemon/CLI/GUI all use it)
│   ├── houndd/             # the daemon: Unix-socket API over a pluggable engine
│   └── hound/              # CLI client
├── assets/icons/           # dog-head brand mark + 4-state tray ladder
└── gui/                    # Tauri 2 desktop app (system tray + scan UI)

Architecture

        houndd  (Rust daemon — the engine)
       ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
       │  ScanEngine trait                │
       │  ├─ L1  ClamAV signatures (now)  │
       │  ├─ L2  Curated threat packs(Pro)│
       │  ├─ L3  Behavioral monitor (Pro) │
       │  └─ L4  Supply-chain checks(Pro) │
       └──────────────┬───────────────────┘
              Unix socket (JSON-RPC, line-delimited)
          ┌───────────┼───────────┐
       hound CLI   GUI (Tauri)   future modules

The daemon is the only process that touches a scanning engine. CLI and GUI are thin clients — so future suite tools (firewall, updater, …) plug into the same socket.

Swapping the engine (the ClamAV seam)

ClamAV is a temporary dependency. Everything ClamAV-specific — version probe, signature freshness, the clamscan subprocess + output parsing, freshclam — lives in one file behind a four-method trait:

crates/houndd/src/engine.rs
    trait ScanEngine { name; probe; scan; update }
    struct ClamAvEngine            // today
    const ENGINE: ClamAvEngine     // ← flip this line when the native
                                   //   engine lands; nothing else in the
                                   //   daemon, CLI, GUI, or wire API moves

The wire stays engine-agnostic: Status.engine names the implementation ("clamav" today) and Status.db carries what any signature store has — a file name and a timestamp. When our own Rust engine ships, it's a new ScanEngine implementation, a one-const flip, and the tray/CLI/GUI simply start reporting the new engine name.

Icon system

The brand mark is a solid dog head (assets/icons/hound.svg), a single flat fill. It ships in two treatments:

  • Brand ladder hound-{16,22,24,32,48,256}.png — native periwinkle #9896E0, for the window icon, About box, and marketing.
  • Tray-state ladder state-<name>-{16,22,24,32,48}.png — the same path re-tinted per security state, for the system-tray sentinel:
State Fill Meaning
protected #22C55E green up-to-date / protected / clean
scanning #F59E0B amber scan in progress / signatures need update
threat #EF4444 red infection found
paused #6B7280 gray real-time monitor off

Green is the good state; amber is work in progress, never a failure.

Quickstart (development)

Prereqs: Rust (see rust-toolchain.toml), Node 20+, ClamAV, and the Tauri system libs (libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev, libgtk-3-dev, libayatana-appindicator3-dev).

# 1. Signatures (needs the clamav freshclam DB)
sudo freshclam

# 2. Daemon (terminal 1)
cargo run -p houndd

# 3. Scan (terminal 2)
cargo run -p hound -- status
cargo run -p hound -- scan ~/Downloads

# 4. GUI
cd gui && npm install && npm run tauri dev

Verifying the engine with the EICAR test file

EICAR is the industry-standard 68-byte test signature — every AV that works will flag it. Generate it and scan it:

printf 'X5O!P%%@AP[4\\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H*' > /tmp/eicar.com
cargo run -p hound -- scan /tmp/eicar.com
# expect: exit code 1, "Eicar-Test-Signature FOUND"

Updating signatures

hound update wraps freshclam (trying sudo freshclam first, since plain-user runs can't write /var/lib/clamav and /var/log/clamav). The GUI's "Update Signatures" button drives the same RPC and shows the log.

cargo run -p hound -- update        # or: hound update --json

The GUI (gui/)

A Tauri 2 desktop app — a thin view over the same houndd socket the CLI uses (via the shared hound-api client), so the window and the command line never disagree about your security state.

gui/
├── dist/            # the front-end (vanilla HTML/CSS/JS, premium dark shell)
└── src-tauri/       # Tauri 2 shell + system-tray sentinel

The tray sentinel swaps the 4-state icons (green/amber/red/gray) as your state changes; the window shows a live protection hero, a scan progress bar, a results table, and the signature-update log.

Build it:

cd gui
npm install
npm run tauri dev          # dev with hot reload
npm run tauri build        # → .deb in src-tauri/target/release/bundle/

Git conventions

  • Branch main is deployable; small, focused commits.

  • No hardcoded secrets. For pushes, the bot token lives in a repo-local credential file (never tracked):

    git config credential.helper 'store --file=.git/.git-credentials'
    chmod 600 .git/.git-credentials
    echo 'https://<user>:<token>@git.joelovestech.com' >> .git/.git-credentials
    
  • Commits: imperative subject, ≤ 72 chars. Example: houndd: add line-delimited JSON-RPC socket API

License

TBD — core daemon likely proprietary (freemium), shared CLI possibly OSS. Decision pending; workspace.package.license = MIT is a placeholder.