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dev 46c90b0f59 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies
Seven detections, all under the free tier. The line Joe and I settled
on is scope rather than capability: an individual protecting their own
machine gets every check at full depth, and what is sold is the same
protection made continuous, enforced, and shared across a team.

**Containers.** The Docker socket is the one that matters. Mounting
/var/run/docker.sock into a container is not access to Docker, it is
root on the host — anything that can talk to that socket can start a
privileged container with the host filesystem mounted — and the
explanation says exactly that. Also privileged: true, host networking,
bind mounts of /, /etc, ~/.ssh and ~/.aws, secrets baked into image
layers (with the part people learn too late: docker history keeps them
after a later instruction deletes them), curl piped into a shell during
a build nobody watches, ADD from a URL, running as root, and COPY . .
with no .dockerignore shipping the .env and the whole .git directory
into a published image.

**Disabled certificate checking**, across nine ecosystems. Reported as
a warning rather than a critical because it is often deliberate, and
skipped entirely in test files — turning verification off in a fixture
is normal, and flagging it there is how a check gets switched off
wholesale. The explanation leads with the trap: the connection still
looks encrypted.

**Prompt injection inside dependencies.** Hound already read the
project's own CLAUDE.md; an assistant working in a repository reads far
more than that, including the README of every package it touches. All
of that is attacker-controlled text, and publishing a package whose
README addresses the assistant instead of the reader costs nothing to
try. The finding names the package, including scoped ones, and resolves
nested dependencies to the innermost package — the one that actually
shipped the file.

An injected instruction file inside a dependency used to produce two
findings, one from each check. It reports once now, as the dependency
finding: "the package awesome-agents ships an injection" is something a
person can act on, and "there is an injection in this file" is not.

**CI beyond GitHub** — GitLab, Jenkins, CircleCI, Bitbucket, Azure,
Drone. The GitLab equivalent of pull_request_target requires both merge
request pipelines and a protected-variable reference before it reports;
merge request pipelines alone are how everybody uses GitLab, and
flagging them would fire on nearly every project.

Also adds crates/hound-api/src/license.rs: an entitlement check so
nothing ships untiered by accident. It does not try to stop anybody —
the binary is Apache-2.0 and the check can be deleted — and there is no
phone-home, so a machine with no network still knows what it bought and
we never learn where our software runs. An expired licence falls back
to Free rather than failing closed: somebody whose card lapsed must not
end up with less protection than a stranger who installed Hound this
morning, and there is a test for it. Every message about an absent
capability has to name what still works, which is also tested.

466 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
action 0.1.8: a GitHub Action, and a light theme that is actually light 2026-08-21 13:40:35 -05:00
assets/icons 0.1.6: security hygiene, and right-click scanning 2026-08-21 13:15:35 -05:00
crates 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies 2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
dist 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies 2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
gui 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies 2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
packaging 0.1.6: security hygiene, and right-click scanning 2026-08-21 13:15:35 -05:00
site rootkit: stop reporting every process on the machine as hidden 2026-08-21 11:21:06 -05:00
tools defs: rebuild and publish the feed daily instead of by hand 2026-08-21 12:31:54 -05:00
.editorconfig Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00
.env.example Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00
.gitignore Full feature set: realtime monitor, quarantine vault, rootkit scan, settings, events 2026-08-20 20:33:44 -05:00
Cargo.lock 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies 2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
Cargo.toml 0.1.9: container config, disabled TLS, and injection inside dependencies 2026-08-21 14:37:36 -05:00
README.md Engine seam (ScanEngine trait) + Tauri GUI 2026-08-20 17:55:40 -05:00
rust-toolchain.toml Rust engine + CLI over ClamAV Unix socket 2026-08-20 16:59:14 -05:00

Hound Antivirus

A premium, freemium antivirus for Linux. One engine, three faces: a Rust daemon (houndd), a CLI (hound), and a Tauri GUI with a system-tray sentinel that changes color with your security state.

Built for the distros people actually run: Ubuntu, Debian, Linux Mint, and anything else that ships ClamAV.

Repository layout

antivirus/
├── Cargo.toml              # Rust workspace
├── crates/
│   ├── hound-api/          # shared wire types + socket client (daemon/CLI/GUI all use it)
│   ├── houndd/             # the daemon: Unix-socket API over a pluggable engine
│   └── hound/              # CLI client
├── assets/icons/           # dog-head brand mark + 4-state tray ladder
└── gui/                    # Tauri 2 desktop app (system tray + scan UI)

Architecture

        houndd  (Rust daemon — the engine)
       ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
       │  ScanEngine trait                │
       │  ├─ L1  ClamAV signatures (now)  │
       │  ├─ L2  Curated threat packs(Pro)│
       │  ├─ L3  Behavioral monitor (Pro) │
       │  └─ L4  Supply-chain checks(Pro) │
       └──────────────┬───────────────────┘
              Unix socket (JSON-RPC, line-delimited)
          ┌───────────┼───────────┐
       hound CLI   GUI (Tauri)   future modules

The daemon is the only process that touches a scanning engine. CLI and GUI are thin clients — so future suite tools (firewall, updater, …) plug into the same socket.

Swapping the engine (the ClamAV seam)

ClamAV is a temporary dependency. Everything ClamAV-specific — version probe, signature freshness, the clamscan subprocess + output parsing, freshclam — lives in one file behind a four-method trait:

crates/houndd/src/engine.rs
    trait ScanEngine { name; probe; scan; update }
    struct ClamAvEngine            // today
    const ENGINE: ClamAvEngine     // ← flip this line when the native
                                   //   engine lands; nothing else in the
                                   //   daemon, CLI, GUI, or wire API moves

The wire stays engine-agnostic: Status.engine names the implementation ("clamav" today) and Status.db carries what any signature store has — a file name and a timestamp. When our own Rust engine ships, it's a new ScanEngine implementation, a one-const flip, and the tray/CLI/GUI simply start reporting the new engine name.

Icon system

The brand mark is a solid dog head (assets/icons/hound.svg), a single flat fill. It ships in two treatments:

  • Brand ladder hound-{16,22,24,32,48,256}.png — native periwinkle #9896E0, for the window icon, About box, and marketing.
  • Tray-state ladder state-<name>-{16,22,24,32,48}.png — the same path re-tinted per security state, for the system-tray sentinel:
State Fill Meaning
protected #22C55E green up-to-date / protected / clean
scanning #F59E0B amber scan in progress / signatures need update
threat #EF4444 red infection found
paused #6B7280 gray real-time monitor off

Green is the good state; amber is work in progress, never a failure.

Quickstart (development)

Prereqs: Rust (see rust-toolchain.toml), Node 20+, ClamAV, and the Tauri system libs (libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev, libgtk-3-dev, libayatana-appindicator3-dev).

# 1. Signatures (needs the clamav freshclam DB)
sudo freshclam

# 2. Daemon (terminal 1)
cargo run -p houndd

# 3. Scan (terminal 2)
cargo run -p hound -- status
cargo run -p hound -- scan ~/Downloads

# 4. GUI
cd gui && npm install && npm run tauri dev

Verifying the engine with the EICAR test file

EICAR is the industry-standard 68-byte test signature — every AV that works will flag it. Generate it and scan it:

printf 'X5O!P%%@AP[4\\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H*' > /tmp/eicar.com
cargo run -p hound -- scan /tmp/eicar.com
# expect: exit code 1, "Eicar-Test-Signature FOUND"

Updating signatures

hound update wraps freshclam (trying sudo freshclam first, since plain-user runs can't write /var/lib/clamav and /var/log/clamav). The GUI's "Update Signatures" button drives the same RPC and shows the log.

cargo run -p hound -- update        # or: hound update --json

The GUI (gui/)

A Tauri 2 desktop app — a thin view over the same houndd socket the CLI uses (via the shared hound-api client), so the window and the command line never disagree about your security state.

gui/
├── dist/            # the front-end (vanilla HTML/CSS/JS, premium dark shell)
└── src-tauri/       # Tauri 2 shell + system-tray sentinel

The tray sentinel swaps the 4-state icons (green/amber/red/gray) as your state changes; the window shows a live protection hero, a scan progress bar, a results table, and the signature-update log.

Build it:

cd gui
npm install
npm run tauri dev          # dev with hot reload
npm run tauri build        # → .deb in src-tauri/target/release/bundle/

Git conventions

  • Branch main is deployable; small, focused commits.

  • No hardcoded secrets. For pushes, the bot token lives in a repo-local credential file (never tracked):

    git config credential.helper 'store --file=.git/.git-credentials'
    chmod 600 .git/.git-credentials
    echo 'https://<user>:<token>@git.joelovestech.com' >> .git/.git-credentials
    
  • Commits: imperative subject, ≤ 72 chars. Example: houndd: add line-delimited JSON-RPC socket API

License

TBD — core daemon likely proprietary (freemium), shared CLI possibly OSS. Decision pending; workspace.package.license = MIT is a placeholder.