Antivirus/crates/houndd
Hound 6beb73771a hound-supply: the supply-chain and agent-era scanner
Phase 4's detection core, as a standalone crate. This is the part with no
competitor on Linux, and deliberately the part with no Linux in it —
file parsing and logic only, no fanotify, no /proc, no eBPF — so the
macOS and Windows port is weeks rather than a second product.

Five detectors, 88 tests:

  pickle        GLOBAL/STACK_GLOBAL walk over .pt/.ckpt/.pkl/.joblib.
                torch.load runs a stack machine; a model file is a
                program and downloading weights is a code-execution
                decision.
  injection     Instructions aimed at a coding agent in CLAUDE.md,
                AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, copilot-instructions.
  installscript preinstall/postinstall hooks that curl|sh, decode and
                run, reach for credentials, or install persistence.
  typosquat     Damerau-Levenshtein against popular names, plus
                slopsquat detection: new + near-zero downloads + one
                edit from something popular is the signature of a name
                a model invented and somebody then registered.
  mcp           Servers fetched unpinned at launch, handed secrets, or
                pointed at $HOME or credential paths.

Wired through `supply.sweep` on the socket and `hound supply-chain
<path>`, which exits 1 on a critical so it drops into CI.

Three things worth recording:

* Scoring is by independent category, not by keyword count. One
  suspicious phrase is a phrase; two categories at once is an attack.
  A file that only says "ignore previous instructions about formatting"
  is a warning, not a critical.

* Proximity matters more than presence. The first version flagged an
  entirely ordinary conventions file, because it mentioned ".env" in
  one paragraph and "prefer small commits" in another. A credential and
  a movement verb now have to appear within a sentence of each other.
  The test that caught it is kept as the regression.

* Pickle call detection has to come out of the opcode walk, not a byte
  search. REDUCE, INST and OBJ are the ASCII letters R, i and o, which
  also occur inside every string the stream carries — searching raw
  bytes finds the o in "os" and reports a call that never happens,
  turning every warning into a critical.

Every finding carries a plain-language explanation and a next step, and
there is a test asserting explanations do not leak rule identifiers or
jargon. The audience includes people who cannot triage a YARA match and
should never be shown one.

Verified against a demo project holding a squatted @vue plugin with a
curl|sh postinstall, a poisoned CLAUDE.md in a vendored repo, an
unpinned MCP server holding a GitHub token, and a pickle calling
os.system — four criticals and one warning, while the legitimate
CLAUDE.md, the real express manifest and the properly-scoped MCP server
beside them stayed clean.

189 tests pass across the workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 23:48:48 -05:00
..
examples houndd: gate covers writes too; inotify becomes the fallback 2026-08-20 23:27:34 -05:00
rules houndd: replace the clamscan fork with yara-x in process 2026-08-20 22:05:09 -05:00
src hound-supply: the supply-chain and agent-era scanner 2026-08-20 23:48:48 -05:00
Cargo.toml hound-supply: the supply-chain and agent-era scanner 2026-08-20 23:48:48 -05:00