a3f31288fa
A clean laptop reported 988 critical rootkit findings; this server
3786, PID 1 among them. Every one was false, and the cause was our own
systemd hardening.
ProtectProc=invisible hides processes the daemon does not own from its
view of /proc, while kill(pid, 0) keeps answering truthfully because it
is a syscall and not a filesystem lookup. The hidden-process check
compares exactly those two sources, so with that setting every process
on the machine looked concealed. Enumerating processes is this daemon's
job, so it needs the default view.
Removing the setting is not enough on its own — hidepid= on the /proc
mount produces the same blindness and we do not control that. So the
detector now recognises when it cannot see:
- PID 1 is the control. It always exists and nothing hides init; a
rootkit that did would break the machine it is living on. If PID 1
answers kill(1, 0) but is absent from the listing, we are blind and
say so as info rather than crying rootkit.
- A plausibility ceiling of 32. Hiding a handful of processes is the
entire point of a rootkit; hundreds means a broken observer. An
antivirus that reports a critical rootkit finding on every clean
machine teaches people to ignore the one time it is real.
Also in this change, from testing on a real desktop:
- Closing the window hides it to the tray instead of exiting, with a
one-time notification so it does not read as a crash. Quit lives
only in the tray menu and confirms first. The settings already had
close_to_tray and confirm_quit fields wired to nothing; they are
honoured now rather than hardcoded.
- The tray menu and Scan Home sent the literal string "~". A shell
would have expanded it, nothing here did, so the daemon was asked
to scan a directory of that name. It failed silently until the
per-peer readability check made it audible.
- Administrative actions elevate through polkit instead of telling
people to open a terminal. The app tries unprivileged first and
only on a privilege refusal runs `pkexec hound admin-rpc`, which
forwards one request as root. auth_admin_keep, because prompting on
every settings toggle trains people to authenticate without reading
the prompt. This grants what `sudo hound` already grants to people
who could already run sudo — a transport, not a new privilege.
- `hound settings exec-gate on|off` now exists. The install script,
the AppImage banner, the rpm spec, the AUR install file and
llms.txt all told users to run `hound settings set exec_gate true`.
There was no `set` subcommand and no way to enable the execution
gate from the CLI at all: the flagship paid feature was unreachable
and the first thing a new user was told to type returned an error.
A test now asserts every documented command parses.
- `settings show` displays the exec gate state, and no longer prints
its own header twice.
- The CLI help still described ClamAV, which has not been the engine
for some time. So did the socket permission error, which now
explains the `hound` group and the log-out-and-back-in it needs.
368 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
69 lines
2.3 KiB
RPMSpec
69 lines
2.3 KiB
RPMSpec
Name: hound
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Version: 0.1.0
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Release: 1%{?dist}
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Summary: Hound Antivirus for Linux
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License: Apache-2.0
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URL: https://houndav.com
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Source0: %{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
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BuildRequires: rust >= 1.91, cargo, systemd-rpm-macros
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Requires: systemd
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Suggests: clamd
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%description
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Endpoint and supply-chain protection built for the distributions people
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actually run. Scanning is yara-x in process; real-time protection uses
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fanotify, so a binary can be refused at execve rather than reported after
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it has already run.
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The execution gate is installed switched OFF. It needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN and
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covers the whole root filesystem, so enabling it is the operator's call:
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hound settings exec-gate on
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%prep
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%autosetup
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%build
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cargo build --release -p houndd -p hound
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%install
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install -Dm755 target/release/houndd %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/houndd
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install -Dm755 target/release/hound %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/hound
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install -Dm644 packaging/systemd/houndd.service \
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%{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/houndd.service
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install -Dm644 crates/houndd/rules/hound-builtin.yar \
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%{buildroot}%{_datadir}/hound/rules/hound-builtin.yar
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install -dm755 %{buildroot}%{_sharedstatedir}/hound/rules
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install -dm700 %{buildroot}%{_sharedstatedir}/hound/vault
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for s in 16 22 24 32 48 64 128 256 512; do
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install -Dm644 assets/icons/app-${s}.png \
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%{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/${s}x${s}/apps/hound.png
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done
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install -Dm644 assets/icons/hound-app.svg \
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%{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/hound.svg
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%post
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# The built-in rules are compiled into the binary; %{_sharedstatedir}/hound/rules
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# is for additional packs only. Seeding it there compiles them twice.
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%systemd_post houndd.service
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%preun
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%systemd_preun houndd.service
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%postun
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%systemd_postun_with_restart houndd.service
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%files
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%{_bindir}/houndd
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%{_bindir}/hound
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%{_unitdir}/houndd.service
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%{_datadir}/hound/rules/hound-builtin.yar
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%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/*/apps/hound.png
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%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/hound.svg
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%dir %{_sharedstatedir}/hound
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%dir %{_sharedstatedir}/hound/rules
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# The vault holds live malware: root-only, never world-readable.
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%attr(0700,root,root) %dir %{_sharedstatedir}/hound/vault
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%changelog
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* Fri Aug 21 2026 Hound <support@houndav.com> - 0.1.0-1
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- yara-x engine in process; fanotify execution gate
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